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   1 
EXPLOITATION AND THE CLASS STRUGGLE 





This paper contributes to our understanding of the determinants and dynamics of Marxian 
exploitation using quarterly UK data, 1955-2008. Initially a simple model is introduced for 
the  purpose  of  defining  exploitation  and  its  component  parts,  before  elaborating  on 
theoretical issues which are important in estimating the rate of exploitation. In the empirical 
analysis we seek to explain the effect of class struggle, for the UK economy, using quarterly 
data. Attention is paid to three forces which are traditionally seen as drivers of power in the 
class struggle: (i) political party; (ii) the size of the “reserve army” of the unemployed; (iii) 
working class militancy. Our results suggest a positive impact of unemployment on the rate 
of  exploitation,  and  that  growing  working  class  militancy  tends  to  diminish  the  rate. 
Changes in political party affect the rate of exploitation in a counter-intuitive way, with a 
positive short-run relationship between the rate and movements to left-wing government. 
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1. Introduction 
The claim that capitalism is an exploitative economic system is one of the central 
tenets of Marxian social science. While the term “exploitation” may be used in many 
ways in contemporary economics — for example to describe situations where firms 
with monopoly power achieve abnormal profits — in Marxian economics it is defined 
in a specific way. Basically, in capitalism, to be exploited means working for longer 
than is necessary to produce the equivalent of what one consumes. 
 
Marx’s original formulation of exploitation was embedded in his theory of value. The 
difficulties inherent in this approach absorbed the attention of Marxist scholars for 
many years. However, in the 1970s and 1980s approaches began to emerge which 
relocated versions of exploitation theory in price systems inspired by Leontief, Sraffa 
and Arrow-Debreu.
2 The separation acted as a stimulus to radical theory: Marxian 
economists  who  found  the  traditional  formulation  of  value  and  price  problematic 
could  now  engage  in  research  on  the  theory  of  exploitation,  unencumbered  by 
mainstream criticism.  
 
One of the most noteworthy contributions to Marxian exploitation theory was made 
by Roemer (1980, 1982, 1988, 1994). Using the language and techniques of general 
equilibrium  and  game  theory  he  derived  outcomes  which  suggested  that  the 
differential  ownership  of  productive  assets  (DOPA)  was  the  primary  normative 
inequity in capitalism and that the traditional Marxian formulation of exploitation, 
                                                 
2 These approaches — described by some as “supply side Marxism” — focus on price 
in terms of the cost of labour and non-labour inputs, plus profit. In dynamic settings 
Marxist analyses have also explored effective demand and its role in crisis, examining 
the overlap between Marx, Keynes and Kalecki (see Trigg, 2006). Our “supply-side” 
approach concentrates on production.   3 
expressed in terms of surplus-value and surplus labour-time, was secondary. Roemer 
(1994,  p.110)  did  eventually  concede  that  labour  plays  a  role,  too,  in  defining  a 
normatively  useful  concept  of  capitalist  exploitation.  However,  DOPA  was  also 
essential in this definition. 
 
There  remains  ongoing  interest  in  Roemer’s  seminal  work  (Veneziani,  2007, 
Yoshihara, 2010). The goal of this body of research has been to look at the welfare 
properties of capitalism from a microeconomic perspective, in a manner not unlike 
the search for, and proof of, the welfare theorems of mainstream general equilibrium 
theory.  While  this  research  has  merit  we  intend  to  adopt  a  different  approach  to 
analyse the same concept, in a way also inspired by the methods and techniques of 
mainstream theory. Using the techniques of time-series econometrics we estimate the 
rate and evolution of exploitation in the UK economy and explain it empirically in 
terms  of  specific  macroeconomic,  social  and  political  forces.  This  quantitative 
Marxist  approach  focuses  on  class-income  distribution  emerging  out  of  the 
production process. However, we accept that DOPA, at the microeconomic level, is 
an important generative mechanism. 
 
We  begin,  in  Section  2,  by  defining  exploitation  in  a  Marxian  sense,  before 
considering a number of pertinent theoretical concerns. In particular the productive-
unproductive  labour  distinction  is  rejected  as  an  unnecessary  artefact  of  classical 
economics.  Secondly,  we  recall  Roemer’s  (1994)  argument  for  treating  the  self-
employed,  conceptually,  as  exploitation-neutral.  In  Section  3  we  calculate  the 
quarterly  exploitation  rate  for  the  UK  economy,  1955-2008,  and  consider  the 
variables to be used to measure the balance of class forces. Before concluding the   4 
penultimate section uses the Johansen (1988, 1991) cointegration and vector error 
correction model to examine changes in the exploitation rate as a consequence of 
changes in the balance of class forces. 
 
2. Theoretical Underpinnings 
The Marxian notion of exploitation in capitalism is founded on Marx’s analysis of 
surplus-value (for discussion of exploitation in other economic systems see Roemer 
1982, 1994). This can be expressed in various alternative and equivalent ways, in 
each case encapsulating distribution between worker and capitalist. We can identify 
two broad explanatory approaches towards the Marxian exploitation rate: 
1.  Decompose the technical determinants; 
2.  Estimate statistical relationships between exploitation and class struggle. 
In  this  section  we  will  adopt  the  first  approach,  defining  exploitation  and 
decomposing  it  (as  in  Marx,  1976,  pp.  281-672)  into  its  constituent  elements.  In 
Section 3 we examine exploitation statistically, explaining changes in the UK rate in 
the last half-century. The elements of “class struggle” which will be investigated are 
political party, working class militancy and unemployment. 
 
In order to define exploitation let us take a simplified economy (following Roemer 
1988, pp.42-44). For a given technology { } L , A  assume that  A is an  ) ( n n´  input-
output coefficient matrix and L  is a  ) 1 ( n ´  vector of direct labour inputs used to 
produce each commodity. We shall assume L is measured by the number of hours 
worked in a given time period (in our econometric analysis we will use quarterly 
data). Assume b is an  ) 1 ( ´ n  vector of workers’ consumption goods. In this case we   5 
are interested in finding the vector of gross outputs (x) which will produce b as a net 
output. If  x A  are the inputs consumed in the year, the required output will be: 
b x x + = A           (1) 
Roemer elaborates on this by taking I  which is an  ) ( n n´  identity matrix. If  ) ( A I -  
is invertible and productive — i.e. it is capable of producing positive net outputs — 
an economically meaningful solution to (1) is: 
b x 1 ) ( - - = A I          (2) 
The expression in (2) is measured in physical quantities. 
 
In order to derive  a Marxian exploitation rate let us now consider the amount of 
labour  (measured  by  the  number  of  hours  worked)  needed  to  produce  workers’ 
consumption.  Following  Roemer,  if  the  labour  embodied  in  each  unit  of  the  n 
commodities in the economy is given by the  ) 1 ( n ´  vector Λ, we can define socially 
necessary labour time (SNLT) as follows: 
b L Λb 1 ) ( SNLT - - = º A I         (3) 
That is SNLT is a scalar defined as the amount of direct and indirect labour required 
to produce workers’ consumption. 
 
It is a characteristic of capitalist production that workers as a whole generally work 
for longer than the time required to produce the equivalent of what they themselves 
consume. If aggregate hours worked in the economy are given by H  then  SNLT H -  
measures the surplus labour time being preformed by workers. The ratio of the latter 
to SNLT gives us an expression for the rate of exploitation (e): 
SNLT
SNLT - H
= e              (4)   6 
This equation is consistent with one of Marx’s formulations of exploitation, in terms 
of surplus and necessary labour time (1976, pp. 281-672).
3 This can then be related to 
the  decomposition  suggested  above.  In  equation  (4)  an  increase  in  H  (absolute 
surplus-value) will, ceteris paribus, increase e. Likewise a reduction in the real wage 
(which changes b) implies that SNLT, defined in equation (3), diminishes, since the 
consumption bundle is reduced and can thus be produced more quickly. Finally, if 
there is productivity increase (which affectsΛ) the length of time required to produce 
a given consumption bundle diminishes, thereby increasing e.
4 
 
There  are  two  theoretical  issues  which  warrant  further  consideration  prior  to  our 
empirical analysis. First, in previous empirical estimates of the rate of surplus-value 
the distinction between productive and unproductive labour has been applied (e.g. 
Gouverneur, 1990). Although frequently applied in Marxian work this categorisation 
of labour is not straightforward. Of the many definitions used (see Laibman, 1992), 
the analytic definition — which defines labour as productive if it creates surplus-
value — is perhaps the most widely applied in Marxian economics. It is also the 
relevant concept when estimating the rate of exploitation. In this paper we do not 
apply the productive-unproductive labour distinction for the following reason. Once a 
complex social division of labour has taken place it is arbitrary to ascribe the source 
of wages, or surplus-value creating activity, to individuals or particular sectors. Since 
capitalism  is  a  system  it  is  incorrect  to  define  some  employees  as  exploited,  and 
                                                 
3 The rate of exploitation can also be expressed, in aggregate, in monetary terms, as 
the ratio of profits, interest and rent to wages paid (i.e. variable capital). This is the 
way we will calculate the exploitation rate in the empirical analysis. 
4 An alternative approach to income distribution is provided by the Gini coefficient 
(for example see Roemer, 2008). This conflates wage and non-wage income, though 
such  a  measure  has  the  advantage  of  being  sensitive  to  wage  inequality.  The 
distribution of wages is an important intra-class issue. However, the purpose of our 
paper is to examine the inter-class distribution between wage and non-wage income.   7 
others as not, when both groups may be receiving the same wage, with equivalent 
background and conditions. In this paper exploitation is conceived of as a relationship 
between classes and society based on receipts of wage and non-wage income. 
 
A second conceptual issue presents itself in examining a two-class model. The self-
employed (or petit-bourgeoisie) are empirically relevant. The conceptual formation of 
class has been discussed at length by Roemer (1988, 1994). Using microeconomic 
theory,  and  assuming  rational  optimising  agents,  he  shows  that  five  classes  can 
emerge in a capitalist economy (where exploitation is mediated via the labour market): 
(i)  pure  capitalist;  (ii)  small  capitalist;  (iii)  petty  bourgeois  artisan;  (iv)  semi-
proletarian;  (v) proletarian. Capitalists are, in  essence,  employers; proletarians  are 
employed. However, some agents — small capitalists, petty bourgeois artisans and 
semi-proletarians — are wholly or party self-employed. For example petty bourgeois 
artisans work entirely for themselves, hence they do not extract surplus-labour, or 
profit, from another. In this sense they are exploitation-neutral. Semi-proletarians are 
partly  self-employed,  but  also  sell  some  labour  on  the  labour  market.  They  are 
exploitation-neutral while engaged in self-employed activity, but are exploited while 
engaged in paid work for another. Hence, in empirically calculating e, self-employed 
activity (and remuneration) should be removed and we should focus on wage and 
non-wage income derived from employment. 
   8 
3. Variables and Data 
Defining exploitation thus, changes in e can be driven by various elements in our 
decomposition. These elements are changes in working hours (H), technical change 
(influencing  Λ )  or  changes  in  the  real  wage  (impacting  b ).  Another  important 
determinant of change in e is change in the balance of class power, which impacts on 
it via various elements in our decomposition. For example, when unemployment is 
high we can speculate that e will be high because employers can force workers to 
accept reduced wages and work longer hours. In this situation the cause of movement 
in e is an alteration in the balance of class forces, and changes in the real wage and 
working hours are the mechanism through which exploitation is increased.  
 
Although class relations may be obscured in capitalist economies today, there remain 
identifiable income streams associated with work and non-work (which is the basis 
for defining class in this paper). Political and economic forces may also influence 
these  income  streams.  It  is  the  relationship  between  exploitation  and  these  forces 
which we will consider in this section. In particular we are interested in the following 
variables: (i) the political party in power; (ii) working class militancy; and, (iii) the 
“reserve army” of the unemployed. 
 
The evolution of e for the UK is presented in Figure 1, and the data sources used for 
each of our variables is outlined in Appendix 1. The period investigated is 1955Q1 to 
2008Q4 and this was determined, strictly, by the availability of data. For the purpose 
of estimation we will define e as the ratio of profit to wages, excluding the self-
employed. Thus, calculated quarterly, the numerator is the sum of the gross operating 
surpluses of public non-financial institutions, private non-financial institutions and   9 
financial corporations (not seasonally adjusted, NSA). The denominator is the total 
compensation of employees for each quarter, and we can therefore derive e, quarterly, 
for the period 1955-2008. Note we derive this in monetary units, for the following 
reason. If we were to calculate aggregate SNLT and aggregate surplus labour time we 
would do so by allotting total hours worked in proportion to aggregate wage and non-
wage income. Given this transformation procedure the numerator and denominator 
would be affected equivalently. Hence, for present purposes, it is an unnecessary step. 
 
The first independent variable, political party (of government), is of interest because 
of  the  historical  constituencies  of  the  left-wing  Labour  Party,  and  the  right-wing 
Conservatives. In the UK political system the latter receive significant funding from 
employers, via private donations, while the former are largely funded by trade unions. 
Hence, within mainstream politics, the Labour Party are seen as the party of workers 
and the Conservatives the party of employers. In contrast, in Marxist analyses, the 
State is seen as a regulator of social relations between capital and labour. The goal of 
the State, in these circumstances, is to ensure the continuance of capitalism. As such, 
we cannot necessarily assume that the Labour Party will support the working class, 
and  the  Conservatives,  business.  The  relationship  between  e  and  political  party 
therefore becomes crucial in evaluating these two competing perspectives. We will 
initially hypothesise that e will be affected negatively if the Labour Party gains a 
parliamentary majority, and positively if the Conservatives gain power. The variable 
P  is defined 0 if the Conservatives are in power and 1 if the Labour Party is in power. 
 
A second cause of variation in e is the extent of working class unity, which is a 
partial manifestation of class consciousness. The capitalist strategy of “divide and   10 
rule” can, for example, be countered by trade union activity intended to strengthen the 
position of the working class in the distributive struggle. In order to measure working 
class unity and militancy we shall consider strike action (measured by the number of 
days lost due to industrial action, S ) as a proxy for this. Some studies use the number 
of industrial disputes (e.g. Arestis & Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal, 1998); we initially 
used this measure, but there was no long-run relationship. Conceptually, the approach 
we adopt also gives greater weight to disputes involving large number of workers, 
which is reasonable. 
 
The  third  independent  variable  we  investigate  is  the  claimant  count  (NSA).  The 
relationship between distribution and unemployment — or the “reserve army” — is a 
hallmark of the Marxian analysis of capitalism. In order to estimate the association 
between unemployment and e we will use the claimant count (U ) to measure the 
size of the reserve army of the unemployed.
5 We hypothesise that in periods when the 
number unemployed is growing the balance of class forces shifts toward capitalists, 
thereby facilitating rising exploitation. The logic of this is that when unemployment is 
high employers are able to force wages down, increase hours for those in employment 
(perhaps while shedding workers), or introduce new production methods. 
 
                                                 
5 We do not investigate the causes of unemployment, though we may speculate on 
some  of  them.  Technical  change  was  one  factor  which  Marx  considered,  and  a 
tendency toward monopoly another (1976, pp. 781-794). Post-Keynesian approaches 
have  focussed  on  aggregate  demand  and  the  role  of  investment  (e.g.  Arestis  & 
Sawyer, 2005, Smith & Zoega, 2009). Since our paper is focussed on the supply side 
of the economy we do not explore such issues.   11 
4. Econometric Methodology and Results 
Having  outlined  our  theoretical  model  and  data  sources,  this  section  analyses  the 
effect  of  P ,  S and  U  on  the  long-run  behaviour  of  e.  The  expected  long-run 
relationship is as follows 
                             f(P, S, U) e =                                           (5) 
In order to perform our analysis we transformed e and the latter two variables into 
natural logarithms, i.e. le, lS , and lU , and then applied the Johansen (1988, 1991) 
cointegration and vector error correction model (VECM): 
           t t t i t
p
i
i t Ds X DX DX e m ad ab + + + + G = - -
=
= ∑ 0 0 1
1
1
'         (6) 
This has a constant restricted to lie in the cointegration space,  } , , { t t t t lU lS le X = , 
0 0 0 g a ab m ^ + = , such that  0 b  is an intercept in the cointegration relationships and 
0 g is equal to zero. The coefficient  0 d represents mean shifts in the variables which do 
not cancel out in the cointegration space. Mean shifts are captured by a set of dummy 
variables,  t Ds . Note that this variable is P , which has been treated as exogenous. In 
our  analysis  we  also  included  three  centred  seasonal  dummies  to  account  for 
seasonality effects. 
 
We selected the number of lags for our VECM according to the Schwarz information 
criterion (from a maximum of 10). This was in order to control for autocorrelation 
and delays in the transmission process. Based on this criterion we used 10 lags, which 
is intuitively reasonable given the distributional effects of a change in political party 
may  experience  long  delays.  The  baseline  model  was  been  checked  for  signs  of 
misspecification  —  i.e.  normality,  autocorrelation  and  heteroskedasticity  —  and 
results are reported in Tables 1 and 2. The hypothesis of normality of the residuals   12 
was  rejected.  However,  because  the  normality  problem  arises  from  an  excess  of 
kurtosis, the estimators by maximum likelihood are robust (Gonzalo, 1994). 
 
Table 3 presents Johansen’s stationarity tests. The null hypothesis is rejected at the 
10% significance level for r = 1 and it cannot be rejected for le if r = 2. The choice of 
the  cointegrating  rank  was  made  by  looking  at  the  trace  test  and  roots  of  the 
companion matrix, which are reported in Tables 4 and 5. In this system we only had 
one cointegrating vector, although shocks have long lasting effects. The graph of the 
cointegrating relationship is reported in Figure 2, which mimics a white noise process. 
 
Once the cointegrating rank has been determined, the next step in the analysis was to 
test for long-run exclusions of variables. The hypothesis that P  and the drift are long-
run excluded cannot be rejected at the 10% significance level (χ
2(2) = 1.141, p-value 
= 0.565). This implies that the drift in the cointegration space cancels out, as well as 
the long term effects of the political party. 
 
Next, we tested for the weak exogeneity of the variables and the results point to the 
non-rejection of such a hypothesis for the variables DlS and DlU (χ
2(4) = 7.760, p-
value = 0.101). This means that the error correction term will only appear in one 
equation, i.e. Dle.. This result accords with our initial hypothesis, which explains e as 
a function of the rest of the variables. Thus, the identified cointegrating vector is: 
                                   t t t lU lS e l
) 126 . 4 ( ) 677 . 2 (
483 . 0 280 . 0 ˆ
-
- =             (7) 
where the t-statistics appear in parentheses. This result is as expected. As the claimant 
count rises the rate of exploitation rises. In classical Marxian terms a rising “reserve” 
army of the unemployed impacts on the labour market, shifting the balance of class   13 
forces towards capitalists, causing e to rise. The effect of working class militancy is 
also pronounced, and as expected. As workers are more militant then days lost to 
strike action increase, shifting the balance of class forces toward workers, causing e 
to fall. Our analysis shows that this effect is pronounced; in fact nearly half of the 
movements in lS  are transmitted to exploitation.  
 
In  order  to  test  for  the  stability  of  the  cointegrating  vector  and  the  adjustment 
parameter we display the graphical representations of the Hansen & Johansen (1999) 
tests  in  Figure  3.  According  to  these  tests  the  cointegration  vector  and  loading 
parameters  are  stable.
6   We  have  also  reported  the  impulse  response  function  in 
Figure 4, where it is noticeable that shocks have log lasting effects on exploitation. 
This  implies  that,  after  a  shock,  the  variable  needs  long  periods  to  return  to  the 
equilibrium. The short-run matrices have been reported in Appendix 2. In terms of 
results the effect of changes in the political party  Dle DP  is perverse. Change in 
political party, from right-wing to left-wing in the previous period, exerts a small, 
positive, but statistically significant, effect on e. This result conflicts with our initial 
hypothesis,  and  runs  counter  to  the  mainstream  interpretation  —  where  the  term 
“mainstream”  is  used  colloquially  —  of  the  traditional  constituencies  of  the 
respective political parties. 
 
                                                 
6 Following  Hansen  &  Johansen  (1999)  the  R  representation  of  the  test  is  more 
relevant since it keeps the dynamics fixed during the recursive estimation. Given that 
the  representation  of  the  test  is  below  one  during  most  of  the  sample  period  we 
conclude that the parameters are stable. For the alpha matrix the test appears to be 
stable only after some initial years. However, given that this test is a recursive one, 
instabilities at the beginning of the period do not imply the existence of structural 
breaks.   14 
There may be a number of potential causes of this. First, the effect is weak and one 
interpretation might be that the policy differences between the parties are small. The 
traditional  view  of  the  Labour  Party  as  pro-worker  may  allow  them  to  introduce 
policies which increase exploitation more effectively than would be possible under 
the Conservatives. Alternatively, there are different strategies which capitalists can 
adopt to extract surplus. If a left-wing government introduces wage regulation and 
limits on working hours then capitalists may shift strategy to alternative methods of 
surplus extraction, such as productivity increase. And, productivity increase, through 
its impact on L , may be  a more effective way to increase e  than holding wages 
down or work-time excess. In other words regulation of hours and pay generates a 
beneficial unintended consequence for capitalists. This explanation would resonate 
with  Marx’s  analysis  of  nineteenth  century  Britain  where  the  legal  limitations  on 
work-time imposed by the Factory Acts resulted in a shift of focus from extensive to 
intensive  methods  of  labour  utilisation.  Thus,  left-wing  policies  may  positively 
influence wages and hours, but capitalist strategy would shift to intensifying work. 
And, the latter is a more effective way to exploit workers than is the former. Finally, 
the variables we have used are derived from national income statistics expressed in 
gross terms. It is important to distinguish between gross incomes and the distribution 
achieved after tax, benefits and subsidies have been accounted for. In other words the 
significance of right-wing and left-wing governments may be felt more in the process 
of redistribution rather than in production. 
 
4. Conclusion 
It is a central tenet of Marxian economics that capitalism is exploitative. This implies 
workers work for longer than is necessary to produce the equivalent of what they   15 
themselves consume. Microeconomic studies have focused on the microfoundations 
of exploitation. The innovation of this paper is that we have calculated the rate of 
exploitation for the UK economy using an extensive run of quarterly data, considering 
it in relation to a number of politico-economic determinants. Our results suggest that 
the traditional argument concerning the “reserve army” of the unemployed — which 
links rising levels of unemployment to increasing exploitation — accords well with 
the historical record. Secondly, working class militancy (measured by days lost to 
industrial action) also has a profound negative impact on the rate of exploitation, as 
Marxian  economists  would  expect.  However,  when  we  examined  the  empirical 
relationship between UK political parties and exploitation we generated a paradoxical 
result (from the perspective of mainstream politics). In switching from right-wing 
Conservative  to  left-wing  Labour  administrations  exploitation  tends  to  rise.  This 
lends support to the hypothesis that the role of both parties is to support the State in 
regulating social relations between capital and labour. 
   16 
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Table 1: Univariate misspecification tests 
Test  Dle  DlS  DlU 
ARCH  0.086  0.346  0.357 
J-B  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Skewness  -0.178  -0.260  -0.239 
Kurtosis  4.460  9.022  4.743 
Note:  ARCH  stands  for  Autoregressive  Conditional  Heteroskedasticity.  J-B  is  the 
Jarque-Bera  test  for  normality.  For  these  two  tests  the  p-values  have  been 
reported. 
 
Table 2: Multivariate misspecification tests 
Autocorrelation:  Ljung-Box  χ
2(369) = 474.6 (0.000) 
  LM(1)  χ
2(9) = 10.49 (0.312) 
  LM(2)  χ
2(9) = 11.652 (0.234) 
Normality    χ
2(6) = 10.49 (0.000) 
ARCH:  LM(1)  χ
2(36) = 35.631 (0.486) 
  LM(2)  χ
2(72) = 72.994 (0.445) 
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Table 3: Johansen’s stationarity test 
r  DF  le  lU  lS 
1  2  0.039  0.006  0.071 
2  1  0.154  0.009  0.025 
           Note: Restricted constant and weakly exogenous variables included in the 
cointegration relations. P-values are reported. 
 
Table 4: Trace test for the cointegration rank 
r  Eigenvalue  Trace  p-value 
0  0.104  45.031  0.028 
1  0.080  22.321  0.120 
2  0.024  5.099  0.545 
 
 
Table 5: Companion matrix roots (modulus) 
r=3  r=2  r=1 
0.993  1.00  1.00 
0.993  0.990  1.00 
0.961  0.961  0.962 
0.915  0.961  0.962 
0.915  0.908  0.959 
0.909  0.893  0.932 
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Figure 2: Cointegrating relationship 
Beta1'*Z1(t)
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Figure 3: Test for beta and alpha constancy 
 
Test of Beta(t) = 'Known Beta'
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Appendix 1: Exploitation Statistics Quarterly UK (None Seasonally Adjusted) 
Abbreviation  Definition  Source 
NQNV  Gross Operating Surplus: Financial Corporations: 
Total: CP NSA 
Blue Book 
NRJK  Gross Operating Surplus: NFCos: Private: Current price: 
NSA 
Blue Book 





Income based: UK: Uses: Total compensation of 
employees:D.1: CP NSA 
Blue Book 
Exploitation (e)  (NQNV+NRJK+NRJT)/HAEA  Derived 
P  The political party in government for all or most of the 
quarter. 
House of Commons Library, Social and General Statistics Section, Election Statistics: UK 
1918-2007 (Edmund Tetteh) 
S (BBFW)  Aggregate Strike Days  Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (2009) Trade Union 
Membership 2008. National Statistics 
U (BCJA) 
 
Claimant count (UK) – thousands 
NSA 
 
Because of industrial action by employment staff the figure 
in December 1974 was not collected, so the 1974, Q4 figure 
is the average of the October and November claimant count. 
 
November 1976 was the same, thus 1976, Q4, was a two-
month average. 
 
Due to industrial action the January 1975 and December 
1976 are estimates. 
 
Department of Employment and Productivity (1971) British Labour Statistics Historical 
Abstract 1886-1968. London: HMSO. 
 
Department of Employment and Productivity (1969) Employment and Productivity 
Gazette. London: HMSO. 
 
Department of Employment (1970-1978) Department of Employment Gazette. London: 
HMSO. 
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GAMMA(5) 
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GAMMA(9) 
 
  DLe{9}  DLU{9}  DLS{9} 





















WEAKLY EXOGENOUS/FIXED VARIABLES: 
Time t-0 
       DP 
DLe    -0.004 
      (-0.187) 
DLU    -0.011 
      (-0.354) 
DLS    -0.036 
      (-0.096) 
 
Time t-1 
       DP{1} 
DLe     0.036 
       (1.632) 
DLU    -0.017 
      (-0.555) 
DLS    -0.975 
      (-2.671) 
 
Time t-2 
       DP{2} 
DLe    -0.017 
      (-0.749) 
DLU    -0.036 
      (-1.196) 
DLS    -0.168 
      (-0.454) 
 
Time t-3 
       DP{3} 
DLe    -0.005 
      (-0.245) 
DLU     0.005 
       (0.174) 
DLS    -0.185 
      (-0.508) 
   27 
Time t-4 
       DP{4} 
DLe    -0.007 
      (-0.325) 
DLU    -0.026 
      (-0.888) 
DLS     0.497 
       (1.388) 
 
Time t-5 
       DP{5} 
DLe     0.007 
       (0.337) 
DLU    -0.001 
      (-0.044) 
DLS    -0.041 
      (-0.113) 
 
Time t-6 
       DP{6} 
DLe     0.011 
       (0.497) 
DLU    -0.055 
      (-1.890) 
DLS    -0.203 
      (-0.565) 
 
Time t-7 
       DP{7} 
DLe     0.035 
       (1.618) 
DLU     0.066 
       (2.240) 
DLS    -0.179 
      (-0.497) 
 
Time t-8 
       DP{8} 
DLe    -0.003 
      (-0.123) 
DLU     0.038 
       (1.270) 
DLS     0.011 
       (0.030) 
   28 
Time t-9 
       DP{9} 
DLe    -0.006 
      (-0.251) 
DLU    -0.019 
      (-0.637) 
DLS     0.333 
       (0.908) 
 
CENTERED SEASONALS 
        SEAS1    SEAS2    SEAS3 
DLE      0.016    0.034   -0.017 
        (0.755)  (1.921) (-0.833) 
DLU      0.099    0.047    0.117 
        (3.569)  (1.957)  (4.185) 
DLS     -0.227   -0.340   -0.333 
       (-0.670) (-1.162) (-0.970) 
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